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Intellectual Property

by Laurence P. Colton*
Nigamnarayan Acharya**
Todd Williams***
and Dana T. Hustins...

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys caselaw developments in the area of intellectual
property, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks, relevant to
Georgia during the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual property law are
patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade secret law.1
Because patent law and copyright law are provided for in the United
States Constitution,2 these cases are based in federal law and are
*

Partner in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts

University (B.S.Ch.E., 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Wisconsin-Madison (B.S., 1998); Emory University (J.D., 2001). Member,
State Bar of Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
*** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Florida (B.A., 2002); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2005). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
**** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
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1. Some secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article include trade dress
and know-how. Further, as most precedential decisions are under federal law, this Article
will not include cases from the state courts.
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "The
Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The terms "Authors" and
"Writings" refer to copyright, and "Inventors" and "Discoveries" refer to patent.
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litigated in federal courts. Trademark law and trade secret law have
both federal3 and state aspects, and the cases regarding these areas are
based on federal or state law. However, the more interesting cases often
are litigated in the federal courts.
The Authors have not attempted to include all cases that touch upon
intellectual property but instead have selected decisions that are of more
significance or interest, or that may indicate a particular direction in
these areas of law. While the cited cases often have multiple issues, the
Authors have reported only on the more relevant or interesting
intellectual property issues. As such, this Article will focus on developments selected from the federal courts that are controlling or binding on
federal courts in Georgia.
II.

PATENT CASES

A.

Claim Construction
Patent claims, at least in the United States, are usually in the form
of a series of numbered expressions that follow the description of the
invention in a patent or patent application. Patent claims define, in
technical or scientific terms coupled with legal terms, the protection
conferred by a patent and are often paramount both in examination
proceedings in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") and in litigation. In cases involving patent infringement, the
claims first must be construed to determine the metes and bounds of the
patent, or in other words, the scope of coverage or protection of the
patent.4
In SafeTCare Manufacturing, Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the circuit court that
hears all appeals relating to interpretations of patent law irrespective of
the district, applied its Phillips v. AWH Corp.' precedent in construing
the claims of a patent.7 The claim at issue recited a "pushing force"
that caused a section of a hospital bed to rotate upwards. The alleged
infringing hospital bed utilized a motor that exerted a pulling force that

3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation, and provides that "[tihe Congress shall have power... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
4. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
5. 497 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
6. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
7. SafeTCare Mfg., 497 F.3d at 1269.
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caused a similar upward rotation.' The pulling force on one part of the
hospital bed resulted in a pushing force on another part of the hospital
bed. 9 The Federal Circuit held that the product did not infringe the
patent because the specification of the patent repeatedly described
pushing forces.' ° Citing its precedent in Phillips, the Federal Circuit
wrote: "[W]e rely on the specification merely to understand what the
patentee has claimed and disclaimed."1'
In Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 2 the Federal Circuit held that the
transitional phrase "comprising the steps of' did not render open-ended
the words and phrases of a claim directed to the production of spherical
ice cream pellets.13 The patent-in-suit involved a method having six
steps for freezing, storing, and serving "beads" of ice cream.14 Dippin'
Dots, Inc., the owner of the patent, sued various distributors after they
stopped buying ice cream from Dippin' Dots and started competing with
Dippin' Dots using products from other manufacturers. 5 The distributors argued that they did not infringe the step of "freezing said dripping
alimentary composition into beads" because they were freezing the
alimentary composition into both beads and irregular pellets.' 6 The
court held the transitional term "comprising" did not render the element
open-ended to both beads and irregular pellets, noting that comprising
"'is not a weasel word with which to abrogate claim limitations."'17

8. Id. at 1265-66.
9. Id. at 1268-69.
10. Id. at 1269-71.
11. Id. at 1270 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316).
12. 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed Cir. 2007).
13. Id. at 1340, 1343.
14.
"A method of preparing and storing a free-flowing, frozen alimentary dairy
product, comprising the steps of:
[(1)] preparing an alimentary composition for freezing;
[(2)] dripping said alimentary composition into a freezing chamber;
[(3)] freezing said dripping alimentary composition into beads;
[(4)] storing said beads at a temperature at least as low as -20' F. so as to
maintain said beads free-flowing for an extended period of time;
[(5)] bringing said beads to a temperature between substantially -10 ° F. and -20*
F. prior to serving; and
[(6)] serving said beads for consumption at a temperature between substantially 10' F. and -20' F. so that said beads are free flowing when served."
Id. at 1340.
15. Id. at 1341.
16. Id. at 1340, 1342-43.
17. Id. at 1343 (quoting Spectrum Int'l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
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These decisions build on a trend by the United States Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit to interpret patents, and especially patent
claims, more narrowly and to give greater weight to the wording chosen
by the inventors.
B.

Territorialityof Patents
Under strictly provincial notions of territoriality, patents remain
discrete, national instruments, a classification which has been challenged in today's globally oriented economy. During 2007 the United
States Supreme Court examined the territorial aspects of patent
infringement in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f. 18
In Microsoft Corp. v.A T & T Corp.," the Supreme Court held that
§ 271(f) of the Patent Act does not expand the territorial scope of United
States patent protection" by creating liability for exporting one or more
"components" of a patented invention so that the components may be
copied and the whole invention may be practiced abroad.21 A T & T
was the assignee of the patent-in-suit covering a computer for encoding
and compressing recorded speech. Microsoft's Windows® software
contained code that enabled computers to compress speech in the
manner covered by the patent.22 In order to avoid paying royalties to
A T & T for sales abroad, Microsoft sent master versions of its Windows® software to foreign computer manufacturers who would arrange
for the reproduction of the Windows® software and install the copied
18.

35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). Section 271(f) provides that:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the

United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
Id.
19. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
20. There is no such thing as a worldwide patent. Rather, patent law is territorial. A
United States patent covers infringing acts that occur in the United States but generally
disregards extraterritorial activity.
21. 127 S. Ct. at 1760.
22. Id. at 1750.
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versions of the software onto their machines. Microsoft conceded that a
computer with Microsoft Windows® software that also has the ability to
encode and compress recorded speech, if installed on a computer in the
23
United States, would infringe the patent-in-suit in the United States.
As such, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a foreigninstalled copy of software that was developed in the United States is, for
patent purposes, a "component" that is "supplied" from the United States
under § 271(M.24

In holding that the copied software was not a "component" under
§ 271(f), the Supreme Court interpreted the word "component" narrowly
to refer only to concrete copies of a computer program, rather than to the
"abstract" computer code that composes the program in some ideal
sense. 25 The Supreme Court also relied on Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.26 to emphasize the territorial nature of patents and to
determine that Congress would have used more expansive language if
it had intended the section to operate outside the territorial limits of the
United States.27 After concluding that the "very components supplied
from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability
when combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue ...[and
because] the copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign
computers were not themselves supplied from the United States," the
28
Supreme Court held that Microsoft did not infringe the patent-in-suit.
C. Nonobviousness
In KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc. ,29 one of the most important
decisions relating to patent law in recent years, the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit's strict application of the "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" test ("TSM test") for finding a combination of
elements to be patentable over the prior art.3" The patent-in-suit
included a claim for a pedal mechanism in which an adjustable vehicle
control pedal was connected to an electronic throttle control, both of
which are known elements in the art. KSR, the alleged infringer, argued

23. Id. at 1753.
24. Id. at 1750-51. "The question before us: Does Microsoft's liability extend to
computers made in another country when loaded with Windows software copied abroad
from a master disk or electronic transmission dispatched by Microsoft from the United
States? Our answer is 'No."' Id.
25. Id. at 1753-56.
26. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
27. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1759-60.
28. Id. at 1757, 1759.
29. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
30. Id. at 1734.
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that this combination was not patentable because merely combining
these two elements was obvious. KSR won at the district court level, but
the district court decision was overturned by the Federal Circuit in
January 2005. Applying the TSM test, the Federal Circuit held that the
combination was nonobvious because the prior art did not disclose a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the various parts
together.31
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected any notion that
the concept of obviousness in patent law can be rigidly or narrowly
defined, holding that "[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by
a formalistic conception."32 The Supreme Court looked with disfavor on
the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test and reaffirmed
Supreme Court precedent regarding the obviousness of patents "based
on the combination of elements found in the prior art" when the
combination "does no more than yield predictable results."33 The
Supreme Court noted that "[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between
the idea underlying the TSM test and the [Court's general] analysis.
But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that
limits the obviousness inquiry..., it errs. " "
In Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v.Lupin, Ltd.," which was
decided soon after KSR, the Federal Circuit held that a purified
component was obvious over a known mixture containing the component.3 6 The patent-in-suit37 claimed the pharmaceutical compound
ramipril formulated "substantially free of other isomers," which was
found nonobvious by the lower court prior to the Supreme Court's KSR
decision.3" In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit held that
the purified form of a compound from a known mixture is prima facie
obvious because a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
reasoned that the mixture derived properties from the purified ingredient.3 9 However, the court did note in dicta that a purified isomer is
"not always prima facie obvious over the mixture; for example, it may
not be known that the purified compound is present in or an active
ingredient of the mixture."4 °

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1734-39.
Id. at 1741.
Id. at 1739.
Id. at 1741.
499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1301-03.
U.S. Patent No. 5,061,722 (filed Jan. 12, 1989).
Aventis PharmaDeutschland, 499 F.3d at 1300.
Id. at 1301-02.
Id. at 1301.
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The Federal Circuit, in In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,4 reiterated that references outside the patentee's field of endeavor can be used
to render a patent obvious." ICON Health and Fitness ("Icon") owned
a patent on a treadmill with a folding base that allowed the base to fold
up for easy storage. During a reexamination proceeding before the
USPTO, the examiner concluded that Icon's patent claims were invalid
because they were obvious in light of two prior art references. Icon
argued that one of the references (the "Teague" reference), which
described a dual-action spring for folding beds, was from a different field
of endeavor than its treadmill invention and, therefore, should not be
used in an obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).43 The
Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that "'[a] reference is reasonably
pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the
inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which
it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention
in considering his problem.'

4

Thus, while the Teague reference may

have come from a different field of endeavor, it addressed the same
problem that the patentee was trying to solve and therefore could be
used in a § 103(a) obviousness analysis.45
In Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc.,46 the Federal Circuit ruled that
the district court had used an improper standard in determining the
"level of ordinary skill in the art" when evaluating the nonobviousness
or validity of an issued patent. 47 Apotex sought to invalidate the
patent-in-suit, owned by Daiichi Sankyo Co. ("Daiichi") and directed to
a pharmaceutical compound useful for treating ear infections on the
ground that the invention was "obvious" at the time it was invented.4 8
In finding the patent valid, the district court ruled that a person having
ordinary skill in the art was a "'pediatrician or general practitioner-those doctors who are often the "first line of defense" in treating

41. 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
42. Id. at 1379-80. Section 103(a) prohibits the granting of a patent on an invention
that "would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
43. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d at 1377-78; 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
Longstanding case law has held that only references that are "pertinent" and represent
"analogous art" in comparison to the invention at issue can be used in a § 103(a)
obviousness analysis. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1976); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14, 35 (1966).
44. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d at 1379-80 (quoting In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
45. Id. at 1379.
46. 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
47. Id. at 1257.
48. Id. at 1255-57.
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of their medical training, possess basic
ear infections and who, by virtue
49
pharmacological knowledge.'
The Federal Circuit reversed, ruling instead that "the level of ordinary
skill in the art... is that of a person engaged in developing pharmaceutical formulations and treatment methods for the ear or a specialist in
ear treatments." 0 The Federal Circuit listed several factors courts
consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, which
included: "'(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems
encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4)
rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the
technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.'" 1
Because the Daiichi patent inventors were "specialists in drug and ear
treatments-not general practitioners or pediatricians" and because
general practitioners or pediatricians "would not have the training or
knowledge to develop" pharmaceutical products, the Federal Circuit held
the district court had used an improper standard in its invalidity
analysis.52 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held Daiichi's patent was
obvious at the time it was invented and thus invalid.5"
D.

Priority

In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc.,5" the
Federal Circuit held that a foreign patent application may only form the
basis for priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)55 when that foreign application was filed either by the actual United States applicant, or by
someone acting on his or her behalf at the time the foreign application

49. Id. at 1256 (quoting Daiichi Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 478, 485
(D.N.J. 2005)).
50. Id. at 1257.
51. Id. at 1256 (quoting Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693,696
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
52. Id. at 1257.
53. Id. at 1259.
54. 497 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (2000). Section 119(a) states in relevant part:
An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who
has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an
application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords
similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to
citizens of the United States, or in a WTO member country, shall have the same
effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on
which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such
foreign country, if the application in this country is filed within twelve months
from the earliest date on which such foreign application was filed ....
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was filed. 6 In order to resolve the inventorship issues and, ultimately,
ownership of the patent rights, the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences ("BPAI") declared an interference proceeding between
the Scimed application and the Medtronic application. In this case, the
Scimed patent application was originally filed by a European company
(MinTec) as a European Patent Application. When MinTec's application
was filed, the inventors had not yet assigned their rights to MinTec.
The BPAI ultimately denied priority to Scimed on the grounds that the
owner of the Scimed application was not entitled to priority under 35
U.S.C. § 119(a). The district court affirmed the BPAI's decision.5 7
In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit held that 35 U.S.C.
§ 119(a) does not permit an applicant for a United States patent to
benefit from the priority of an application filed in a foreign country by
a party who was not acting on behalf of the United States applicant at
the time of the foreign filing. s8 The Federal Circuit, citing a case from
its predecessor court, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, held that priority rights under § 119(a) are personal to United
States applicants and that U.S. applicants may only benefit from the
priority of a foreign application if the application was actually filed by
the U.S. applicant or filed on the applicant's behalf. 59 The court noted
that whether "the foreign application [was] filed in accordance with the
laws of the country in which it was filed has no bearing here." ° The
Federal Circuit held that § 119(a) "requires that a nexus exist between
the inventor and the foreign applicant at the time the foreign application
was filed.""' Accordingly, a foreign application may only form the basis
for priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) when that foreign "application was
filed by either the U.S. applicant himself, or by someone acting on his
behalf at the time the foreign application was filed."62

E. CoordinatedInfringement Actions
In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P,63 the Federal Circuit
held that direct infringement did not occur when multiple parties
performed different parts of a single claimed method without a single

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., 497 F.3d at 1298.
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297-98 (citing Vogel v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1068 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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actor controlling or directing the parties' behavior.14 BMC's patents
claimed a method for processing a debit transaction without using a
PIN, a PIN-less debit bill payment ("PDBP"), which required participation of three actors: a payee's agent, a debit network, and a financial
institution.65 As the three actors were at "arms length" rather than a
single entity, the Federal Circuit held that Paymentech could not have
directed or controlled the actions of the three actors.6 6 As such, the
court held that Paymentech did not infringe the patent-in-suit and
acknowledged that "the standard requiring control or direction for a
finding of joint infringement may in some circumstances allow
parties
6
to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement." 1
In ACCO Brands, Inc. v.ABA Locks Manufacturing Co.," the Federal
Circuit reiterated that a device manufacturer or distributor can be found
liable for "willful induced infringement"6 9 only if the patent holder can
prove "direct infringement" either through specific instances of direct
infringement or because the allegedly infringing device necessarily
infringes."° The defendant, Belkin Components ("Belkin"), was the
United States distributor for a computer locking device that allegedly
infringed a patent owned by ACCO Brands ("ACCO"). The allegedly
infringing device was capable of operating in both an infringing and
noninfringing manner. Belkin's instruction manual instructed users how

64. Id. at 1375.
65. Id. at 1375-76. Paymentech processes a PDBP transaction according to the
following sequence, which together includes the elements of the claim of the patent-in-suit:
1. [Tlhe customer calls the merchant to pay a bill using an IVR;
2. [T]he merchant collects payment information from the customer and sends it
to Paymentech;
3. Paymentech routes the information to a participating debit network;
4. [T]he debit network forwards the information to an affiliated financial
institution;
5. [T]he financial institution authorizes or declines the transaction, and if
authorized, charges the customer's account according to the payment information
collected by the merchant; and
6. [Ijnformation regarding the status of the transaction moves from the financial
institution to the debit network and then, through Paymentech, to the merchant
who informs the customer of the status of the transaction.
Id.
66. Id. at 1378-82.
67. Id. at 1381.
68. 501 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
69. Section 27 1(b) states that "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). This is known as "willful induced infringement." Id.
70. 501 F.3d at 1313 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d
1263, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

2008]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1235

to operate the device in the noninfringing manner.7 At trial, ACCO
presented no evidence of specific instances of direct infringement by
customers who had purchased the device.72 Because the device could
be used in a noninfringing manner and because ACCO had not presented
evidence of any instances of direct infringement by actual customers, the
court held that ACCO had not met the burden of proving that Belkin
had willfully induced its customers to infringe.73
F

Standing

Because federal courts cannot grant advisory opinions under Article
III of the United States Constitution, 4 an actual case or controversy,
or standing, must exist to obtain a declaratory judgment.75 Over the
last year, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have been
examining cases concerning standing for issuing a declaratory judgment
in the patent context.
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court addressed whether a patent licensee must terminate or breach its license
agreement in order to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging
the validity of the licensed patent.7 7 Both the United States District
Court for the Central District of California and the Federal Circuit held
that the licensee must terminate the license under the Declaratory
Judgment Act's7" requirement that there be a "case of actual controversy" to establish jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action.79 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a patent licensee is not required
to terminate or breach its license prior to seeking declaratory judgment
of the licensed patent's invalidity (or that the patent was unenforceable
or not infringed).8 " As the Supreme Court concluded, the rule that a
plaintiff must breach or terminate its license-at the risk of incurring

71. Id. at 1310-11.
72. Id. at 1313.
73. Id. at 1313-14.
74. See U.S. CONST. art. III. § 2, cl. 3.
75. See id.
76. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
77. Id. at 767.
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000).
79. Id. at 768; 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). There was a time when the Supreme Court doubted
whether declaratory judgment actions were compatible with Article III's case-or-controversy
requirement. See, e.g., Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928). But
after its passage in 1934, the constitutionality of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act was
upheld because the phrase "cases of actual controversy" was deemed to refer to the type
of cases and controversies justiciable under Article III. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
80. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
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Article 111.81 In so holding, the Supreme
Federal Circuit decision in Gen-Probe Inc.
G.
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business-before seeking a
rights finds "no support" in
Court abrogated the earlier
v. Vysis, Inc.82

Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution8 3 grants
states and state entities immunity from suit in federal court without
their consent.8 4 Several cases in 2007 dealt with claims of sovereign
immunity in patent infringement actions.
In Baum Research & Development Co. v. University of Massachusetts
at Lowell,"6 the Federal Circuit held that a state university's inclusion
of a clause consenting to jurisdiction in federal courts in a patent license
agreement constituted a waiver of the state university's sovereign
immunity for a suit thereon.8 6 In so holding, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's rejection of the university's asserted
sovereign immunity defense, reasoning that because the license provision
at issue contained a clear and unambiguous consent to the jurisdiction
of a Michigan federal court for disagreements arising from the license
agreement, the university had contractually waived its sovereign
immunity.8
The Federal Circuit also rejected the university's argument that the
plaintiff had not shown that the university signatory enjoyed the
authority to waive sovereign immunity, which the university claimed
was only enjoyed by the state legislature of Massachusetts. 8 First, the
court held that the relevant question was not whether the university
signatory possessed the authority to waive the university's sovereign
immunity, but whether the signatory possessed the authority to enter
into the license agreement, which she clearly did under Massachusetts
law. 9 Second, the court held that the burden was not on the plaintiff

81. Id. at 775.
82. 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
84. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
85. 503 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
86. Id. at 1372. The clause in question provided: "This Agreement will be construed,
interpreted and applied according to the laws of the State of Michigan and all parties agree
to proper venue and hereby submit to jurisdiction in the appropriate State or Federal
Courts of Record sitting in the State of Michigan." Id. at 1368-69 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
87. Id. at 1371.
88. Id.
89. Id.

2008]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1237

to prove that the university had acted legally in signing the licensing
agreement; the burden was on the university to prove that it had not
acted legally.9"
In Biomedical PatentManagement Corp. v. California,Department of
Health Services,9 the Federal Circuit upheld a state entity's claim of
sovereign immunity from a suit for patent infringement.9 2 The Federal
Circuit held that a state entity will not be deemed to have waived its
sovereign immunity in a particular suit simply because it waived its
sovereign immunity in an earlier suit concerning the same subject
matter and the same parties.93 The Federal Circuit also reaffirmed
that a state does not waive its sovereign immunity for patent infringement simply by virtue of litigating its own patents.94
H.

Miscellaneous

95
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,
the Federal Circuit held that a
"reasonable royalty" can be greater than the purchase price of the
product.9 6 Monsanto sued a farmer (McFarling) who saved Monsanto's
genetically modified soybean seeds in vigjation of a point-of-sale
agreement. 97 After a jury awarded Monsanto a damages royalty of $40
per seed bag, the farmer appealed arguing that the royalty was
unreasonable because Monsanto customarily sold its seed for $22 per
seed bag with a $6.50 "Technology Fee."9" In dismissing the argument
that the $6.50 "Technology Fee" was the reasonable royalty, the court
held that the $40 per seed bag royalty was reasonable as it accounted for
the harm Monsanto felt as a result of the infringement as well as the
additional benefits garnered by the farmer.99 The court also noted that
the farmer's yield increase of up to $61 per acre supported the fact that
"it was reasonable for the jury to suppose that, in a hypothetical
negotiation, a purchaser would pay a royalty of $40 per bag."'0 0

90. Id. at 1372.
91. 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
92. Id. at 1343.
93. Id. at 1339.
94. Id. at 1343 (citing Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999)).
95. 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
96. Id. at 980.
97. Id. at 976.
98. Id. at 977-79.
99. Id. at 979-80.
100. Id. at 981.
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In Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission, °1 the
Federal Circuit upheld the United States International Trade Commission's ("USITC") imposition of a civil monetary penalty on a corporate
officer who had violated a cease-and-desist order issued by the USITC.10 2 Jack Benun was a principal consultant and later Chief Operating Officer of Jazz Photo Corp. ("Jazz"). The USITC, which has the
authority to investigate the importation of goods that allegedly infringe
United States patents, issued a cease-and-desist order barring Jazz and
its officers from importing certain disposable cameras that infringed
Fuji's patents. An Administrative Law Judge ("A.") with the USITC
later found that Jazz had violated the cease-and-desist order and
imposed a $13 million civil penalty on Jazz. Further, the ALJ held
0 3
Benun jointly and severally liable for the penalty.
On appeal, Benun argued that the USITC lacked the authority to
impose a civil monetary penalty on him because it also lacked the
authority to issue a cease-and-desist order against him.' °4 The Federal
Circuit rejected Benun's argument, citing Wilson v. United States, 0'
wherein the United States Supreme Court held that officers of a
corporation who willfully cause the corporation to violate an order may
be held personally liable for contempt.'
The Federal Circuit also
cited a similar holding in FTC v. Standard Education Society,'0 '
which, like the case against Jazz and Benun, concerned an administrative complaint before a quasi-judicial agency.10 8
In GP Industries, Inc. v. Eran Industries, Inc.,1°9 the Federal Circuit
ruled that a patent owner may only be enjoined from communicating
with potential patent infringers if it can be shown that the patent owner
has acted in "bad faith" and that its allegations of infringement are
"objectively baseless.""0 Eran Industries ("Eran") was the assignee of
a patent relating to rain gutter covers. Several recently terminated
employees of Eran formed a rival company, GP Industries ("GPI"), and
began manufacturing and selling competing products. Eran then sent
letters to several distributors and contractors informing them of Eran's
patent and warning them not to distribute any of GPI's allegedly

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

474 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1285-89.
Id. at 1291.
221 U.S. 361 (1911).
Fuji Photo Film Co., 474 F.3d at 1291 (citing Wilson, 221 U.S. at 376).
302 U.S. 112 (1937).
Fuji Photo Film Co., 474 F.3d at 1291-92.
500 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1375-76.
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infringing products. GPI then sought and obtained a preliminary
injunction enjoining Eran from sending such letters to its potential
customers or distributors."' The Federal Circuit reversed the injunction, noting that patent owners have a right under 35 U.S.C. § 287112
to inform others of their patent rights."3 The court further noted that
injunctions preventing such communications should only be granted if
the patent owner acted in bad faith." 4 Only infringement allegations
that are "'objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits'" rise to this level of bad
faith." 5 Because the lower court had found that it was unknown
which party would prevail on the merits,
the Federal Circuit held that
116
Eran had not demonstrated bad faith.
III.

TRADEMARK CASES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES

In 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and the Georgia federal district courts analyzed various questions of
trademark and unfair competition law. These included questions
pertaining to the extent to which inclusion of a disclaimer can dispel the
likelihood of confusion between two trademarks and the extent to which
a distributor can be held liable for the comingling of trademarked goods
by third-party retailers.

111. Id. at 1371.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
113. GP Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d at 1374. Section 287(a) provides:
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United
States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article
into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented,
either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with
the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not
be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is
contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure so to mark, no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except
on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall
constitute such notice.
35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
114. GP Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d at 1373 (citing Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming,
Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
115. Id. at 1374 (quoting Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)).
116. Id. at 1375.
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In Optimum Technologies, Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives,
Inc.,117 the Eleventh Circuit considered the liability of one party for
trademark infringement based on the actions of another. 118 Optimum
Technologies sued its former distributor, Henkel Consumer Adhesives,
for a series of claims, including trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
These claims arose out of Henkel's decision to stop
distributing Optimum's rug adhesives to home improvement retailers
such as Home Depot and Lowe's and instead to start supplying those
retailers with Henkel's own rug adhesive. After Henkel switched to its
own rug adhesive, some of the third-party retailers in question
mistakenly continued to sell Henkel's new product under Optimum's
mark." 9 The issue for the Eleventh Circuit, in relevant part, was
whether this comingling by Home Depot and other home improvement
retailers could be attributed to Henkel for purposes of Optimum's
trademark infringement claim against Henkel." °
The Eleventh
Circuit held that comingling could not be attributable to Henkel because
2
the comingling in question was only attributable to the retailers.' '
Nor could Optimum change its claim against Henkel from direct
infringement to contributory infringement because Optimum had not
pled the elements of a contributory infringement claim and because
there was no evidence in the record of Henkel's "knowing participation"
in the alleged comingling at the retail level.'22
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
outlined the contours of a false celebrity endorsement claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)' 2' in Unique Sports Products, Inc. v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. 4 The dispute in Unique Sports Products arose
when the plaintiff, Unique Sports Products, who was the exclusive
licensee of tennis legend Pete Sampras's name and likeness for tennis
ball hoppers, sued the defendant, Wilson Sporting Goods, for selling a
tennis ball hopper in packaging that contained Sampras's photograph. 125 The district court, in relevant part, rejected Wilson's motion

117. 496 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007).
118. Id. at 1243.
119. Id. at 1236-38.
120. Id. at 1243.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1246.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
124. 512 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
125. Id. at 1320. Wilson had previously had a license to use Sampras's image on
certain tennis accessories, but that license had expired on December 31, 2002, so Wilson's
continued use of Sampras's image on its ball hopper in 2005 was unauthorized.
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for summary judgment on Unique Sports' false endorsement claims. 126
As the district court noted,
[Flalse endorsement occurs when a defendant uses the name or
likeness of a celebrity in a manner that is "likely to cause confusion
among consumers as to the affiliation, connection, or association
between the celebrity and the defendant's goods" or as12to the celebrity's
"sponsorship or approval" of [the] defendant's goods. 1
The district court then found that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to raise a question of fact on Unique Sports' false endorsement
claim because "[clommon sense" suggested that consumers were likely
to be confused by Wilson's unauthorized use about whether Sampras
endorsed Wilson's product. 2 '
In Freeway Ford, Inc. v. Freeway Motors, Inc.,29 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found that the owner of
the mark "Freeway Ford" had shown a sufficient likelihood of success on
the merits of its various trademark infringement and unfair competition
claims to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction against a
competing car dealership's use of the mark "Freeway Auto Credit." 30
After determining that the Freeway Ford mark was descriptive but
enjoyed secondary meaning based on, inter alia, twenty-six years of
continuous use, the district court analyzed each of the seven factors used
to determine the likelihood of confusion between two marks. 131 Of
particular note, on the second factor, concerning the similarity of the
marks, the district court found that the plaintiff's Freeway Ford mark
and the defendant's Freeway Auto Credit mark were "very similar"
because: 1) both marks used large, bold, blue, block letters for the word
"Freeway"; 2) the fonts used for the word "Freeway" were almost exactly
the same in each mark; 3) both marks included a depiction of the
American Flag; 4) both marks displayed their secondary words ("Ford"
and "Auto Credit," respectively) in smaller font and below the word
"Freeway"; and 5) the defendant's inclusion of a disclaimer of affiliation
with the plaintiff on its Freeway Auto Credit sign was insufficient to
dispel any likelihood of confusion, given that it was so small and
virtually unreadable unless a person was physically on the defendant's

126. Id. at 1324-25.
127. Id. at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parks v. LaFace Records,
329 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2003)).
128. Id.
129. 512 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
130. Id. at 1365.
131. Id. at 1361-65.
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car lot.' 32 After concluding that the other factors also supported a
finding of likelihood of confusion, the district court found that the
plaintiff had met its burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits for its federal and state trademark claims
regarding its Freeway Ford mark.'3 3
IV.

COPYRIGHT CASES

In 2007 the Eleventh Circuit and the Georgia federal district courts
also analyzed various questions of copyright law, including questions
pertaining to the idea/expression dichotomy, the corollary merger
doctrine, and what conduct, absent a written agreement, will suffice to
create a nonexclusive license to use a copyrighted work.
In BUC International Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd.,' M
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a factual compilation of boat
listings, comparable to real estate listings, was protectable by copyright. 35 In holding that the compilation was protectable, the court
made two relevant findings: (1) that the "merger doctrine" 136 did not
preclude copyright protection for the compilation of listings and (2) that
the question of whether the organization, selection, and arrangement of
data in the listings was sufficiently original for purposes of copyright
13
protection 3 1 was a question for the jury, not the court, to decide. 1
On the merger issue, the court rejected the argument that the idea of
presenting brokers with information about boats could only be expressed
in a few ways, using the specific selection of section headings that
BUC-the company that compiled the boat listings-had used. " 9 To

132. Id. at 1362-63.
133. Id. at 1365.
134. 489 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2007).
135. Id. at 1133.
136. There is a dichotomy in copyright law between "facts" or "ideas" on the one hand
and their "expression" on the other: the former are not subject to copyright protection, but
the latter can be. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). However, the "merger doctrine"
operates as an exception to this basic dichotomy and provides that even expression is not
protected in those instances when there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea
that such protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.
See, e.g., BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436,
1442 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (citing Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
137. In FeistPublications,Inc. v.Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the
Supreme Court held that while facts are not copyrightable, compilations of facts may be
copyrightable, if the compiler's selection, arrangement, and coordination of the facts
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. Id. at 344-45.
138. BUC Int'l Corp., 489 F.3d at 1143-45.
139. Id. at 1144.
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the contrary, the court noted that the testimony at trial showed that
there had been no uniformity in listings before BUC had introduced its
listings and that there were in fact a number of potential expressive
14
options and section headings that could be used to list a boat.
Likewise, on the question of the "creativity" that had gone into the
selection and arrangement of facts in BUC's boat listings, the court held
that there was conflicting testimony at trial concerning the originality
of the selection and arrangement,14and
therefore judgment on the issue
1
was precluded as a matter of law.
In Corwin v. Walt Disney Co.,142 the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the
idea/expression dichotomy.4 4
The plaintiff-appellant, Orrin Monroe
Corwin, as the sole heir to the estate of Mark Waters II, sued Walt
Disney World for copyright infringement, alleging that Disney's
Experimental Prototype City of Tomorrow ("EPCOT") theme park had
been based on a painting by Waters of a concept for an international
theme park. 144 During discovery, Corwin submitted four reports from
expert witnesses.'4 5 Disney filed a motion to exclude portions of the
reports, which the district court granted because, among other things,
the portions "impermissibly compar[ed] ideas ... and fail[ed] to compare
expressive or protectable elements."46 The Eleventh Circuit agreed
and upheld the district court's exclusion because the reports had focused
"on the concepts and ideas behind the Painting and EPCOT rather than
on the expression of those concepts and ideas." 4 v Thus, as the court
stated, "[blecause neither the ideas nor the placement of stock elements
are copyright protectable absent a showing that they thereby constituted
expression of ideas, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding all portions of the reports based thereon." 48
In Wilchcombe v. Teevee Toons, Inc.,"' the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed the question of
what conduct, absent a written agreement, will suffice to create a

140. Id.
141. Id. at 1145.
142. 475 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 1251. For a general description of the idea/expression dichotomy, see supra
note 136.
144. Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1243-44.
145. Id. at 1245-47.
146. Id. at 1247.
147. Id. at 1251.
148. Id.; see also Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that if an expert's report relies on uncopyrightable ideas rather than on the expression of
those ideas in analyzing alleged copyright infringement, the report is excludable).
149. 515 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
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nonexclusive license to use a copyrighted work. 5 ° The dispute in
Wilchcombe centered on a song first written and recorded by the
plaintiff, Redwin Wilchcombe, but included on an album from the
musicians Lir John and the East Side Boyz ("LJESB") without attribution or payment to Wilchcombe. 51 When Wilchcombe sued for copyright infringement, the defendants (the artists comprising IJESB and
their record company) argued that Wilchcombe had granted them an oral
or implied license to use the work." 2 The district court agreed, noting
that in contrast to an exclusive license (which must be in writing), a
nonexclusive license to use a copyright may be granted orally or may be
implied when: "(1) a person requests the creation of a work. . .; (2) the
creator makes the particular work and delivers it to the requestor; and
(3) the creator intends that the requestor copy and distribute the
work."5 3 With respect to the requisite "intent," the district court noted
that the appropriate focus is not on the subjective intent of the parties,
but on an objective inquiry into the facts that manifest intent.'
Applying these principles, the district court held that Wilchcombe had
granted an implied nonexclusive license to the defendants because: (1)
Lil' John had requested creation of the work in question; (2) at Lil'
John's request, Wilchcombe had created the work and instructed that it
be sent to Li John; (3) Wilchcombe had testified that it was his
understanding that once Lil' John had the work it would end up on
LJESB's "Kings of Crunk" album; and (4) upon delivering the work to
Lil' John, Wilchcombe had not mentioned that using the work would
constitute copyright infringement.'5 5

V. FINAL NOTES
January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 was another interesting
and relatively active period in the field of intellectual property. As
expected, the courts decided cases interpreting some of the more
precedent-setting cases handed down over the previous few years. Many
of the cases provide insight into the direction the courts appear to be
headed, such as stricter interpretation of the rights granted under the
intellectual property laws and the corollary that intellectual property
practitioners may have to be even more careful in the drafting of
patents, licenses, and contracts.

150. Id. at
151. Id. at
152. Id. at
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at

1304.
1298-1301.
1303.
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